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CHOPPING MIRANDA DOWN TO SIZE 
Michael Chertoff* 
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW. By Joseph D. Grano. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1993. Pp. x, 336. $49.50. 
Who's afraid of Miranda v. Arizona?l In the almost thirty years 
since the Supreme Court decided Miranda, its decision has been 
praised, criticized, expanded, curtailed, and even threatened with 
extinction. A decade ago the U.S. Attorney General identified 
Miranda as an insupportable decision ripe for abandonment;2 over 
one year ago, the last member of the Miranda Court retired;3 and in 
recent years, the Court itself has seemed to cast doubt upon the 
vitality of Miranda.4 Nevertheless, Miranda has survived and even 
- in this era of the Rehnquist Court - flourished. 
Why spill more ink then on the topic of Miranda? Who cares 
anymore? 
Actually, we all do - or should. Because, as Professor Joseph 
D. Grano5 demonstrates in his comprehensive treatment of the pol-
icy and doctrinal roots of Miranda, the Miranda decision rests on 
principles that reflect general and profound attitudes toward con-
fessions, policing, and the nature of the criminal process. At its 
most abstract level, Miranda heralded a dramatic and still-
unresolved impulse to dismantle the traditional distinction between 
* Michael Chertoff is a partner at Latham & Watkins, New York, New York, and New-
ark, New Jersey. He received his A.B. in 1975 and his J.D. in 1978 from Harvard University. 
From 1983-1994, Mr. Chertoff served as a prosecutor with the U.S. Department of Justice, 
including serving as U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey from 1990-94. The views 
expressed herein are Mr. Chertoff's and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Depart-
ment of Justice during the period in which he served. 
1. 384 U.S. 436 {1966). 
2. John A. Jenkins, Mr. Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 19; Philip 
Shenon, Meese Seen as Ready to Challenge Rule on Telling Suspects of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 1987, at A-1. 
3. The members of the Court at the time of the Miranda decision and their dates of 
retirement are as follows: Chief Justice Warren (1969); Associate Justices Clark (1967), 
Fortas (1969), Black (1971), Harlan (1971), Douglas (1975), Stewart (1981), Brennan (1990), 
and White (1993). 
4. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) {holding that Miranda warnings are not 
rendered inadequate as to a suspect who is informed that an attorney will be appointed for 
him if and when he goes to court); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) {holding that failure 
to administer Miranda warnings does not "taint" admissions made after a suspect has been 
fully advised of and has waived his Miranda rights); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 
(1984) (creating a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be 
given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence). 
5. Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. 
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police investigation and the adversary courtroom process, treating 
the former as a species of the latter by inviting lawyers into the 
stationhouse. Although this impulse has never been given free rein, 
at its logical extreme it could obliterate important, well-accepted 
techniques of crime detection. 
Much of the debate over the reach of Miranda stems from this 
embedded impulse to subsume policing within the adversary court-
room process. Ironically, the core of the Miranda decision itself 
need not have been so protean; whatever one thinks of the doctri-
nal foundation of Miranda, at most it supports only a fairly narrow 
result. The transforming possibilities of the decision emerge from 
subsequent embellishments of the Court's reasoning and from the 
prescription of a rule that ranges beyond both the question 
presented in the case and the logic of the answer. Put simply, 
Miranda goes a rule too far, and its overreaching has been the 
source of much of Miranda's troubled history. 
Grano's book invites us to unpack Miranda. Let's identify the 
two strands of its rule and the bases of its reasoning. Let's imagine 
a world with a narrow Miranda rule, and then examine the tensions 
within the post-Miranda world as it actually exists. Grano points 
the Court toward overruling Miranda. But we need not revisit a 
constitutional decision that, for better or worse, has survived. The 
debate over the wisdom of that decision has now left the sphere of 
the Constitution and entered the sphere of disciplinary rulemaking 
that would enshrine Miranda as one of the canons of bar ethics. 
THE ROOTS OF MIRAN.DA 
Miranda claimed to rest on the Fifth Amendment's prohibition 
against compelled self-incrimination.6 The Court acknowledged 
that the original.concept of compelled self-incrimination relates to 
legal compulsion and thus engrafted on that concept the rule 
against involuntary confessions.7 As Grano observes, one may 
challenge Miranda's assertion that the privilege against self-
incrimination and the prohibition on coerced confessions are in fact 
connected as a matter of law and logic (pp. 131, 134-36). On the 
other hand, one may view the relationship between self-
incrimination and involuntary confessions as dependent: in order 
to determine whether a suspect validly waived the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination, one must determine whether the sus-
pect's waiver was voluntary or not. But whatever the foundation of 
the connection between the self-incrimination privilege and the in-
voluntariness rule, the real tour de force in Miranda is the Court's 
6. 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966). 
7. 384 U.S. at 458, 467. 
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expansive redefinition of. the concept of impermissible involun-
tariness. 
The Court's analysis in Miranda begins by cataloguing a verita-
ble horror show of interrogative misbehavior, ranging from beat-
ings, hangings, and whippings through exhausting incommunicado 
questioning and forced sleeplessness, all the way to the threatened 
removal of children and the questioning of a " 'near mental defec-
tive.' "8 To the extent that such misbehavior offended traditional 
notions of due process, however, it was already explicitly forbidden 
by the Fifth or F:ourteenth Amendments.9 Miranda's novelty lay in 
extending the traditional due process limitations on police interro-
gation by suggesting that all custodial interrogation is inherently co-
ercive, irrespective of its actual circumstances (pp. 135-36). 
The law, however, simply did not support the proposition that 
mere custodial questioning is automatically coercive. So the Court 
went about seeking to establish this proposition indirectly. First, 
the Court hinted that the very privacy within which police interro-
gation. occurs creates a presumption of impropriety.10 Then, the 
Court seemingly upbraided the police for trying to obtain a confes-
sion.11 Other techniques evidently viewed askance by the Court in-
clude "display[ing] an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt,"12 
obtaining a psychological advantage by confronting the suspect 
outside his home ground, and offering the subject sympathetic ra-
tionalizations for the suspected offense.13 . Finally, the Court con-
demned the familiar "Mutt and Jeff" routine and police officers' 
use of deception.14 In short, the Court virtually equated involuntar-
iness with "trad[ing] on the weakness of individuals."15 
This reasoning comes perilously close to treating any confession 
as per se involuntary. The Court implicitly seemed to regard as vol-
untary only those confessions offered after polite police questioning 
in a setting comfortable for the suspect and after full disclosure by 
the interrogators. Indeed, it is hard to see why the criticisms of 
traditional interrogative methods should have been limited to custo-
8. 384 U.S. at 446-56. 
9. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322-24 (1959) (holding that the interroga-
tion of a formally charged defendant for eight consecutive hours while ignoring his requests 
to contact his attorney violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 
53-55 (1949) (holding that the interrogation of a suspect for six days without allowing the 
suspect the benefit of counsel or a preliminary ltearing violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
10. 384 U.S. at 448-50. 
11. 384 U.S. at 448-50. 
12. 384 U.S. at 450. 
13. 384 U.S. at 449-52. 
14. 384 U.S. at 452-53. 
15. 384 U.S. at 455. 
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dial questioning, as the police are capable of using deceptiveness 
and psychological ploys to elicit admissions in a noncustodial 
setting. 
This analysis pointed the Court toward a rule that would have 
excluded all confessions, or at least all custodial confessions, as evi-
dence in criminal cases. Yet the Court drew back from an auto-
matic invalidation of all confessions, and even suggested that 
citizens ought to respond to police inquiries made in a noncustodial 
setting.16 The reason is not hard to see. A ruling that all confes-
sions - or all confessions induced by, some form of pressure or 
influence - are involuntary would have overthrown a substantial 
body of prior case law, including the very precedents that had ad-
umbrated the rules on voluntariness. If all custodial confessions are 
inherently involuntary, then there is no reason to test them for vol-
untariness. So, after all the hue and cry about police unfairness in 
obtaining confessions, the Court's cure was to insist that the suspect 
be "effectively apprised of his rights."17 
Importing a warnings requirement into the waiving of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination has some appeal as a policy matter, 
however questionable it may be as a matter of constitutional law. If 
a waiver must be both knowing and voluntary, a warning can be 
justified as a prophylactic assurance that the subject has knowledge, 
thus leaving the issue of voluntariness to a conventional due process 
analysis of the coerciveness of the circumstances. One might con-
clude as a legislator or rulemaker, therefore, that the police should 
advise a suspect that he is under no legal compulsion to speak and 
that if he does so he might suffer the consequences. A postwarning 
confession would then be analyzed for voluntariness under the due 
process test. Such a regime would be generally consistent with the 
prior voluntariness cases and would reflect only the novelty of in-
sisting on an explicit reminder that the subject may choose not to 
incriminate himself. 
But this reasoning at most only supports cautionary instructions 
on the right to remain silent and the consequences of failing to ex-
ercise that right. Such instructions would reflect the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege on which the Court expressly relied in Miranda and 
would give notice of the scope of the waiver sought by the police 
interrogators. Had Miranda been limited to this kind of notice re-
quirement, it would be defensible as at least addressing the consti-
tutional provision the Court was construing, even if the underlying 
interpretive effort might be doubtful (pp. 142-43). 
With sleight of hand, however, the Court transcended the tex-
tual limitations of the right against self-incrimination and intro-
16. 384 U.S. at 477-78. 
17. 384 U.S. at 467. 
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duced a right to the presence of counsel at the interrogation. As a 
matter of legal doctrine, Grano convincingly demonstrates that this 
right is insupportable (pp. 157-58, 170-72). Precedent did support 
- as an independent legal right - the accused's right to counsel in 
facing the prosecution after the criminal process has begun. That 
right was founded, not in any concern about coercive police behav-
ior, but in the text of the Sixth Amendment, which mandates the 
assistance of counsel for defendants in "all criminal prosecutions."18 
Until Miranda's direct progenitor Escobedo v. Illinois, 19 courts had 
applied that right only at the classic adversary stage when the con-
test moves into the courtroom. The rationale was that a defendant 
formally charged and engaged in the judicial process against trained 
advocates should have legal advice. Even Massiah v. United States20 
- which established a postindictment right to counsel during ques-
tioning - created such a right by reasoning that once formal 
charges are filed, the state must address the defendant through "a 
trial, 'in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to 
the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of the 
law.' "21 Indeed, Massiah did not even involve coercive question-
ing; it reflected a traditional and textual view that the Constitution 
treats the indictment as a watershed, after which the formal ma-
chinery of the judicial process - including the right to counsel, 
speedy trial, confrontation, and trial by. jury - becomes 
operational. 
None of this earlier law suggested, of course, that there is a right 
to counsel in all criminal investigations or on all occasions when the 
individual confronts the police. To the contrary, the Court's rea-
soning before Escobedo indicated the opposite because the panoply 
of Sixth Amendment rights was logically - and, in light of the text, 
inevitably - triggered by the same event: charging the accused 
with committing the crime. Expanding the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment into the precharging period would have yielded such 
curiosities as a right to speedy trial at the time of investigation, or a 
right to confront witnesses as police are interviewing them at the 
scene of the crime, or a right to have counsel present in the grand 
jury room. 
To be sure, earlier cases noted that the presence of counsel at an 
interrogation is a factual circumstance to be weighed in evaluating 
whether a confession was coerced.22 But this presence is relevant 
merely because counsel would not likely have allowed coercive be-
18. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
19. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
20. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
21. 377 U.S. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959)). 
22. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 376 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963). 
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havior; thus, counsel's presence is probative evidence of the volun-
tariness of the confession. Consequently, the police would have a 
substantial incentive to supply counsel to defendants in preindict-
ment interrogations. It is fallacious, nonetheless, to conclude from 
this evidence - or even presumption -. of voluntariness that an 
independent legal right to counsel exists at an interrogation. Put 
another way, although counsel's presence may be sufficient to es-
tablish voluntariness,. it is not necessary to establish voluntariness; 
voluntariness can be· established based on other circumstances. 
The obvious conclusion - the conclusion drawn by the dissent-
ers in Miranda - is that the majority's creation of a preindictment 
right to counsel was an artifice designed to eliminate custodial con-
fessions sub silentio. As Justice Harlan observed, "if counsel ar-
rives, there is rarely going to be a police station confession. "23 The 
less obvious effect of Miranda's creation of a preindictment right to 
counsel was the striking extension of the judicially oriented adver-
sary process into the investigative arena. 
Cases decided after Miranda underscore the tenuous quality of 
the extension of a right to counsel into the preindictment period. , 
As Grano observes, the Supreme Court subsequently declined to 
engage the Sixth Amendment in any other case involving police ac-
tivity before the start of formal charging proceedings (pp. 153-55). 
If there was a shrouded Sixth Amendment limb supporting 
Miranda, later cases rendered it very frail indeed. 
But Escobedo-Miranda's effort to expand the right to counsel 
into the preaccusation period did not merely disregard the doctrinal 
and textual limitations on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (p. 
152). In fact, one can conclude that the expansion was part of a 
deliberate - if ultimately only partially successful - design to 
breach those limitations and make policing part of the adversary 
judicial process.24 
THE FRUITS OF MIRANDA 
In spite of the doctrinal weakness of the right to counsel branch 
of Miranda, it has sprouted much of the post-Miranda controversy. 
The Court has expanded that branch of the Miranda doctrine far 
more than the right to silence branch. 
Take waiver, for example. Michigan v. Mosley25 makes clear 
that when an interrogee requests that questioning cease, police may 
nonetheless initiate questioning at a later time and even secure a 
23. 384 U.S. 436, 516 n.12 (1966). 
24. Tellingly, the Miranda majority at one point referred explicitly to police interrogation 
as "a phase of the adversary system." 384 U.S. at 469. 
25. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
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valid waiver of the right to silence.26 In contrast, when an individ-
ual requests the right to counsel, a court will not sustain a subse-
quent waiver of that right unless the individual initiates new 
discussions.27 Indeed, police may not initiate questioning even if 
counsel has been afforded; what is necessary to resume questioning 
is that the lawyer be present.28 
As Justice Powell observed in Edwards v. Arizona, 29 it is hard to 
see why there should be a double standard of waiver for the right to 
silence and the right to counsel.30 Perhaps the best rationale of-
fered is that a request for counsel indicates a desire to surrender 
individual decisionmaking authority and implicitly disables future 
uncounseled waivers. But actually the double standard betrays the 
fact that the right to counsel prong of Miranda does more than sim-
ply warn an individual of his rights: it offers that person the ability 
to transform the preindictment, preaccusatory custodial setting into 
a forum with the characteristics of the more formal, postaccusatory 
criminal process. 
This not-so-latent transforming impulse in Miranda has led sev-
eral members of the Court considerably further. In Arizona v. 
Roberson, 31 the Court held that th~ "prophylactic" rule of Edwards, 
which forbids police-initiated questioning·of anyone in custody who 
requests counsel, extends even to questioning by other officers 
about unrelated investigations.32 The Court's explicit rationale was 
that once a suspect "has indicated his inability to cope with the 
pressures of custodial investigation," he should be insured against 
questioning on any other topic.33 Presumably this rule applies even 
if the second investigation has focused on the suspect only as a sub-
ject or possible witness, and even if the second investigation is in its 
infancy (p. 161). Again, the relentless logic of the Miranda right-to-
counsel prong drives the Court to hand the suspect in custody the 
power to transform even unrelated nascent investigations into ad-
versary proceedings. 
The logic of Roberson is capable of almost infinite expansion. 
For example, one might argue that once an individual has asked for 
26. 423 U.S. at 104 ("[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in cus-
tody has decided to remain silent depends ..• on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 
scrupulously honored."). · 
27. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that an accused, after 
asserting his right to counsel, is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been 
made available to him or the accused, himself, initiates further communication). 
28. 451 U.S. at 485. 
29. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
30. 451 U.S. at 489-90 (Powell, J., concurring). 
31. 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
32. 486 U.S. at 682. 
33. 486 U.S. at 686. 
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counsel during one interrogation, he should be free from custodial 
interrogations in the future even if he has been released from the 
first interrogation. Or, one might advocate an even more extreme 
position - that people should be able to file notices with the police 
indicating prospectively that they want counsel if they are ever 
questioned in custody. Once the complex of Miranda rights be-
comes a device to make all police questioning into a legal adversary 
proceeding, there is no logical stopping point. 
Indeed, some Justices - albeit not a majority - would cut 
Miranda entirely from its roots in the doctrine of coerced confes-
sions by holding that the lawyer for the suspect can trigger the right 
to counsel even without the suspect's knowledge. In Moran v. 
Burbine, 34 three Justices were prepared to hold that Miranda re-
strained the police generally from interfering with the attorney-
client relationship during a period of preaccusatory custodial inter-
rogation, even if the suspect, after being informed of his rights, did 
not request counsel.35 In this minority view, the police were 
obliged, among other things, to inform the suspect that an attorney 
not requested by him had called on his behalf. The denial of this 
information cannot in a meaningful sense be called coercive, be-
cause it does not alter the circumstances of questioning or the pres-
sures felt by the suspect. But the denial is significant if Miranda is a 
means by which police interrogation is transmuted into a quasi-
adversary proceeding. ' 
The linchpin of the Moran dissenters' view is encapsulated in 
the rhetorical introduction and coda of the dissent. The trio of dis-
senting Justices contrasts its view of lawyers as crucial players in an 
accusatorial society with the view of the majority, which is charged 
with viewing the lawyer as a "nettlesome obstacle ... as in ~n in-
quisitorial society."36 Simply put, the Moran minority would com-
plete the Miranda revolution and obliterate the distinction between 
a preaccusation police investigation and the postaccusation adver-
sary judicial system. Under this expansive view, the criminal justice 
process itself would become a judicial adversary process. 
As Grano notes, Moran is in some ways a watershed, for it 
marks a point beyond which a majority of the Court was not pre-
pared to venture (pp. 153-54). Moran itself finally reaffirms that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not an invitation to trans-
form the investigative process but is "applicable only when the gov-
ernment's role shifts from investigation to accusation. For it is only 
then that the assistance of one versed in the 'intricacies ... of law,' 
is needed- to assure that" the prosecution's case encounters 'the cru-
34. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
35. 475 U.S. at 434-68 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
36. 475 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
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cible of meaningful adversarial testing.' "37 As Grano properly 
notes, the types of decisions faced by a suspect prior to formal accu-
sation are not particularly intricate (p. 169). Thus, Moran explicitly 
repudiates the impulse of Miranda to "wrap a protective cloak 
around the attorney-client relationship for its own sake."38 
Yet even after Moran, the thrust of the Miranda right to counsel 
is not fully blunted. First, even in the wake of Moran, cases such as 
Roberson indicate that a request for counsel can trigger broad pro-
tection against future interrogation on different subjects, as op-
posed to the narrow protection afforded by a request for silence. 
Second, and more important, the ethic of Miranda's right to counsel 
has seeped into the criminal law in other respects, giving rise to a 
comparatively new series of claims that the attorney-client relation-
ship of its own force should afford represented individuals protec-
tion, not only against custodial interrogation, but also against any 
sort of police questioning and even undercover operations. This 
new, nonconstitutional landscape is where the seed of Miranda's 
revolution in the right to counsel is now planted. 
SEEDLINGS OF MIRANDA 
Grano's deconstruction of Miranda spurs him to believe that the 
case was inherently and fatally flawed (p. 199). But in a sense the 
thrust of Miranda's right to counsel ·has spread beyond constitu-
tional doctrine. Perhaps those who sought to expand the right to 
counsel into the stationhouse always knew that they would have to 
leave the Constitution itself in search of firmer footing for their ef-
fort. Indeed, Miranda itself draws freely on nonconstitutional 
sources as support for the expansion of the right to counsel.39 In 
Moran, the dissenters criticized the Court for disregarding contrary 
state decisions and the views of the American Bar Association 
(ABA).40 Not surprisingly, therefore, it was the ABA rules gov-
erning professional conduct that gave rise to the most recent - and 
far-reaching - effort to transform police investigation into an ad-
versary process. · 
Grano himself gives fairly short shrift to the effect of Miranda-
type disciplinary rulemaking (pp. 162-63). But in the practicing 
world of criminal law, that effect has been profound. In 1988, the 
Second Circuit surprised many prosecutors with its decision in 
United States v. Hammad41 that sanctions, evidentiary suppression, 
or both could result if law enforcement contacts with represented 
37. 475 U.S. at 430 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). 
38. 475 U.S. at 430. 
39. 384 U.S. 436, 449-52, 486-90 (1966). 
40. 475 U.S. at 441 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
41. 846 F.2d 854, modified, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990). 
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individuals were held to violate the disciplinary rule forbidding 
counsel from communicating directly with an opposing party repre-
sented by counsel. Hammad, as originally cast - not in its subse-
quent modification - seemed to reinvigorate the Miranda right to 
counsel with a vengeance: whenever a suspect retained counsel, he 
might be immune not only from custodial interrogation, but also 
from police questioning and even from contact by an undercover 
agent. Another Second Circuit decision42 suggested that the "prac-
tice of routinely conducting pre-arraignment interviews raises seri-
ous constitutional questions," particularly when "the practice is 
invoked ... against a defendant who is ... unrepresented. "43 The 
Second Circuit suggested that if a suspect could have been repre-
sented - even if he did not request to be - he should be shielded 
from questioning. 
These ample readings of the ABA disciplinary rules suggest a 
regime in which uncounseled interrogation is effectively forbidden, 
and in which counsel must be provided for all but the most casual 
interactions between law enforcement agents and the individual. 
Such a practice would, of course, entail the complete abandonment 
of the distinction between police investigation and adversary judi-
cial proceedings, merging the former into the latter. This result 
would complete the revolution originally heralded by Miranda's no-
tion of the right to counsel. Indeed, the arguments advanced to 
support such a dramatic expansion of the right to counsel under the 
ABA rules resonate with the Escobedo-Miranda arguments of 
thirty years ago, that textual limitations on the right to counsel 
should be overlooked because preaccusatory police questioning can 
be so critical to the eventual outcome of a criminal case. As we 
have seen, that earlier set of arguments formed the original founda-
tion for Miranda's impulse to subsume police investigation within a 
drastically expanded concept of the adversary process. 
The vitality of Miranda's right-to-counsel branch continues to 
be debated, therefore - but outside the restraints of constitutional 
text and, instead, within the framework of the ABA disciplinary 
rules. Even if the Supreme Court has finally pruned Miranda's 
right to counsel as a constitutional matter, the case's rationale now 
fuels bar association arguments for the preindictment, preaccusa-
tion presence of counsel for all police questioning. The U.S. De-
partment of Justice has recently promulgated regulations that 
curtail the application of such broad disciplinary restraints on fed-
eral prosecutors.44 Those regulations are likely to be challenged; in 
42. United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45 {2d Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1161 {1985). 
43. 735 F.2d at 48. 
44. Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,928 {1994) (to be codi-
fied at 28 C.F.R. § 77). 
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any event, they afford no protection to state and local prosecutors. 
The wisdom, if not the constitutional underpinnings, of Miranda's 
protean theory of the right to counsel remains of tremendous cur-
rent interest to those concerned abotJ.t how police should be able to 
investigate crime. 
Grano's book, therefore, is not merely a rehearsal of doctrinal 
discussions now put to rest by the Supreme Court. Rather, it fo-
cuses us on a critical disagreement that first emerged in the consti-
tutional setting in the Sixties and has now been raised again in the 
rulemaking arena in the Nineties. Indeed, the most valuable part of 
the book may not, be its central focus - the discu~sion of academic 
arguments about constitutional interpretation - but its prefatory 
analysis of the policy considerations at stake when some seek to use 
disciplinary rulemaking to merge police investigation into the ad-
versary process. 
Will the American criminal justice system retain its traditional 
division between police investigation and the postaccusation adver-
sary process, or will the right to counsel serve as the instrument by 
which police investigation is transformed into a quasi-judicial ad-
versary process? That debate will now leave the auspices of the 
Constitution and become a subject of bar disciplinary discussions. 
Resolution of these issues should not be left to the comparative few 
who make up the councils of the bar associations; they deserve at-
tention in the broader public - or even legislative - arena. 
